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As part of a larger study of knowledge in relation to inquiry and intellectual life, I have been 
examining the literature on knowledge and thinking about how best to approach the study of knowledge.  
What intrigues me is the effect of academic disciplines on the different brands of knowledge studies, 
because part of what defines a discipline is its approach to knowledge and reality.  Contemplating this 
literature, it is apparent that many disciplines think about knowledge differently, and may even mean 
different things by “knowledge.”  To best study the phenomenon of knowledge as a whole, therefore, I 
suggest that we must reach for a new synthesis that remains outside all traditional disciplines while 
consciously attending to the way disciplinarity itself can structure knowledge (see Dabars, 2008; Becher, 
1989).  Later, I will describe the efforts of two eminent scholars from an earlier generation whose works 
point in the direction of such a transdisciplinary project on knowledge.  
Knowledge is a particularly difficult subject to study because it is so unbounded. Everyone has 
some sense of what knowledge is, and the word and concept of knowledge comes into play all the time, 
because it is so integral to all behavior and activity.  Knowledge is so ubiquitous and commonplace in our 
thinking, such an obvious factor, that it is hard to think creatively about it.  What can we learn about it 
that we do not already know?  Since it is at the surface it should be very visible, but it lurks in the 
background, taken for granted like furniture.  Its essence is slippery and elusive. The subject of 
knowledge is hidden in plain sight in the university and in the library.   
It is also an odd subject to select for investigation.  In one of its many senses, the word 
“knowledge” more or less characterizes the intellectual content of all education.  That is, it is the 
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substance of all disciplines, all subjects.  Since all academic work is or relates immediately to knowledge, 
observing it as a containable category risks being paradoxical.  In another sense, knowledge is idealized 
as the final product of academic work, the prize that justifies the effort.  The aim of all study, research, 
and writing in academia is to contribute to knowledge.  Knowledge in this sense is enlightenment, a lofty 
and ethereal accomplishment.  
No individual discipline can own the subject of knowledge, since it belongs to all scholars and 
inquirers.  Yet knowledge itself has been an object of study in several disciplines.  How, under the 
circumstances, should the study of knowledge be handled in the curriculum, and what are its intellectual 
spaces?  That is, what fields of academic discourse does it engage? 
Questions about the ultimate nature, purpose, and value of knowledge are ultimately 
philosophical questions, so it is necessary to start with philosophy.  Long before the advent of the modern 
university with its disciplines and departments, philosophers have been asking what it means to know, 
how we acquire knowledge, and how we know that we know. Philosophers study the basic and 
fundamental aspects of the meaning and justification of all knowledge.  They have also privileged certain 
kinds of knowledge as the most valuable forms of knowledge (see Allen, 2004).  The philosophical 
analysis of knowledge is about fact, truth, justification, evidence, doubt, external reality (including the 
existence of other minds), and cause and effect.  Knowledge is seen as a special kind of belief, and a 
fundamental question is what criteria differentiate knowledge from other beliefs and opinions.  While 
philosophers may probe the implications and consequences of real world situations from history, current 
events, or everyday life, their preferred method of advancing theory relies on the use of thought 
experiments, in which hypothetical and often improbable scenarios are analyzed for their logical 
plausibility and implications: if this is the case, then it follows that that must also be the case.1 
A different and more recent approach to knowledge has been the sociology of knowledge, which 
focuses on institutional aspects of the construction, development, distribution, and perpetuation of 
knowledge.  But what the sociology of knowledge looks at as knowledge may not be considered real 
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knowledge by philosophers, since the sociologists look at how beliefs are justified, upheld, and shared, 
without reference to how they are proved to be factual by logical and analytical methods.  Truth is 
socially negotiated, and expertise is determined by social processes, through power, persuasion, and 
influence rather than by objective measures.  Both the philosophers and the sociologists are concerned 
with certainty, but they mean different things by it.  Philosophers ask how one can be certain of 
something.  What are the proper, appropriate grounds for certainty?  Sociologists ask what causes people 
to be certain of something in a particular situation.  What criteria do people use to become assure them of 
certainty, to accept something as a fact?  The question of how knowledge claims are evaluated is not the 
normative one of how knowledge claims should be evaluated, as it is for epistemologists, but rather an 
empirical one of how people in a given context actually go about evaluating or justifying a knowledge 
claim. 
Emile Durkheim (1964), one of the first sociologists, coined the term and notion of a “social 
fact,” and a claim of knowledge can be treated by a sociologist as a social fact, something accepted, 
treated, and used as knowledge by convention, whether or not it satisfies a scientific standard of validity.  
The concept of a social fact enables the sociologist to examine the premises behind such practices as 
fortune-telling, alchemy, and witch-hunting as modes of knowledge.  Social facts, however, are not part 
of physical, biological, or psychological reality but inhabit a plane of reality all their own.  Sociologists 
see knowledge as providing a sense of reality, even when it is only a social construct.  For example, 
outside social conventions, there is no difference between a Sunday and a Monday.  In the disciplinary 
division of scholarly space, it is not the sociologist’s job to determine the reality of a claim in any 
dimension other than the social.  But the nonchalant manner in which sociologists of knowledge shrug 
can off the responsibility to confront the objective reality or truth underlying knowledge statements 
infuriates the epistemologists.  Sociologists of knowledge are divided over whether objective knowledge 
is even humanly possible.  Topics in the sociology of knowledge include professionalization, certification, 
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expertise, linguistic, conceptual and social structuring of knowledge, secrecy and selective disclosure, 
codes, bureaucracy, status and roles, and prestige. 
Of course, I have simplified the matter to suggest that all scholars trained as philosophers do one 
kind of analysis when they study knowledge while all of those trained as sociologists use a second, 
mutually exclusive framework.  In fact, there is significant interplay between the philosophers and the 
sociologists, and an entire subset of literature in social epistemology works with problems in the border 
between the two fields, such as trust and the evaluation of testimony (see Goldman, 2002).  
But what I am talking about is neither the philosophy of knowledge, nor the sociology of 
knowledge, nor even the dialectic between them, but rather, the advantage of place both concerns about 
knowledge in an even broader inquiry into knowledge that goes beyond epistemology and sociology. 
Does such a project exist?  If we plunge deeper into the literature on knowledge, we find materials from 
many disciplines that connect only loosely to each other.  Researchers in almost every social science and 
humanities discipline have contributed significantly to the literature about knowledge. [see figure below]  
The literature is scattered throughout the disciplines as well as the interdisciplinary fields, with the result 





Most of the recent literature about knowledge comes out of the burgeoning field of knowledge 
management (KM), with contributions from faculty in schools of business, management, administration, 
and policy studies, departments of organizational studies, and of course, professional managers and 
consultants.  KM is not in itself the study of knowledge but rather a “set of processes that create and share 
knowledge across an organization to optimize the use of judgment in the attainment of mission and goals” 
(Townley, 2001, 45).  As an emerging academic focus if not exactly a discipline, KM must have a formal 
approach to the meaning of knowledge (see Spender 1996, Blackler, 1995; Stenmark, 2001). KM aims to 
maximize the impact of knowledge (Holtshouse, 1998) but only for the benefit of shareholders, since it 
looks at knowledge as an economic product, a resource for the firm or organization. The knowledge 
manager devises tools to capture workers’ knowledge and make it available to others in the firm, so they 
can use that knowledge to create better products.  
The knowledge management viewpoint seems contrary in some ways to an educational or liberal 
arts viewpoint, approaching knowledge as a resource that needs to be elicited from knowledge workers 
for the benefit of the firm rather than a good in its own right.2   In liberal arts, educational or scholarly 
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approaches, curiosity and interest motivate the quest for knowledge.  The KM viewpoint, on the other 
hand, views knowledge as control over a system (see Bernstein, 2009).  The fact that a business-oriented 
view of knowledge has arisen that does not consider the intellectual value of knowledge as an end in itself 
is not necessarily a problem, but one would like to find a common ground that can bring all perspectives 
on knowledge into a single conversation or at least have them connect on fundamental issues and a core 
agenda.  Because the term “knowledge management” suggests a commitment to managerial priorities 
with an emphasis on the bottom line rather than education and scholarship, I suggest we use a different 
term, “knowledge studies” to include knowledge management that is informed by other approaches. 
The knowledge management notion of knowledge relates knowledge to information and data.  
This notion has it that knowledge builds on and synthesizes information, adding value, and at the same 
time refines and filters it.  It takes a great deal of information to get a small amount of knowledge.  This 
view of knowledge as processed information is quite different from previous views of knowledge that 
idealized it as the product of learning and scholarship, a view promoted in traditional humanities and 
liberal arts educational programs.  It is also different from the views promulgated by the epistemologists 
and the sociologists of knowledge.  The new view basically stems from the priorities of administration, 
which is an applied rather than a pure field.  In order to be managed, an individual’s knowledge must be 
elicited, codified, and transformed into a sharable format, whether the product is called knowledge or 
information (McInerney, 2002, 1016).Knowledge is hard to specify, much less measure, but if it is 
described in terms of information it can be quantified, making it useful in administration for accounting 
and evaluation.  Information, unlike knowledge, can be measured as inputs and outputs.   
The knowledge management view of knowledge draws on the closely related fields of 
information science and cognitive science, relying on models of cognition as information processing (see 
Buckland, 1981; Kochen, 1974; De May, 1982, Gleick, 2011; Sowa, 1984).  An even larger context of 
this work is the vast reordering of civilization that occurred during the Cold War, which included an 
explosion of scientific research and an awareness of the increasingly important role of knowledge in the 
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economy, as well as the rise of the knowledge worker.  Besides knowledge, the word and concept of 
“information” rose to great importance beginning in this time period.  After World War II scientific 
research exploded, accompanied by change in the way office work was handled because of the 
development of computers.  Several social forecasters commented on this monumental shift in 
civilization, including Peter Drucker, a management guru, as early as 1959 in his book Landmarks of 
Tomorrow and later, the sociologist Daniel Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (1973) and the 
futurologist Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (1970) (see also Kumar, 1995).  The intensification of 
investment in science and education was closely wrapped up with the Cold War and went into overdrive 
with the Soviet Union’s Sputnik launch in 1957, unleashing a golden age of the American university in 
terms of expansion, prestige, and commitment of resources, which climaxed with the moon landing in 
1969.  This period saw the growth of information theory and the development of the notion that 
knowledge is based on information.  The rise of information theory created the conditions leading to the 
“tendency to conflate knowledge and information” (Kenway et al. 2006, 16).   
Many scholars in information science and knowledge management have advanced formulations 
about the connections and distinctions between knowledge and information, with most seeing knowledge 
as arising from information.  But other possibilities have been put forward.  To get a sense of the 
possibilities in conceptualizing the connection between knowledge and information, consider that Marcia 
Bates (2005) defined knowledge as information given meaning and integrated with other contents of 
understanding, while Jason Farradane defined information as the physical surrogate of knowledge.  Fritz 
Machlup (1979), whose work will be discussed below, considered information to be the process of 
transmitting a message while knowledge was the intellectual content of the message. In a similar vein, 
Claire McInerney (2002) distinguished sharply between knowledge and knowledge artifacts.   
A plethora of literature treats the relationship between knowledge and information.  Knowledge 
and information are such common words in the English language that it is difficult to be technically 
specific about these distinctions, and thus confusion in usage persists.  The notion that knowledge is 
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related to information is in keeping with the changes wrought by the implementation of computer 
technology. But knowledge and information have different conceptual links.  Knowledge is related to 
concepts, ideas, facts, and certainty, while information is related to communication, messages, and 
vehicles of message transmission.  Also, there has been backlash from the humanists, with some writers, 
notably Theodore Roszak (1994), rejecting vehemently the reduction of knowledge to information, or, to 
put it another way, the elevation of information to the status of knowledge.  Roszak’s work is a critique of 
experts who herald the information age and reliance on computers as something that will better society.  
In his words, information does not create ideas, and the mind thinks with ideas, not with information 
(Roszak 1994, 88).   
The knowledge management view of knowledge as tied to information has the advantage of 
breaking down knowledge into a kind of developmental process from data to wisdom, but has the 
limitation of ignoring other ways of looking at knowledge.  Knowledge management leaves behind the 
ivory tower of academic ideas about knowledge and goes out into the real world, but only a certain kind 
of real world, and a certain angle on that real world.  In other words, it trades one kind of hegemony for 
another.  Its standpoint from the management perspective, asking questions about what value knowledge 
can bring, has advantages and disadvantages.  It seems to discount the notion of free inquiry for the 
purpose of satisfying an individual desire to know, particularly for those who are not affiliated with any 
organization.  I suggest that the academic or student on the one hand and the manager or business 
executive on the other inhabit different worlds each with their own specific values and rewards, from 
which they generalize.  These values and rewards need to be recognized, accounted for, and analyzed 
critically. In the final analysis, knowledge management as an incipient applied discipline provides one 
more paradigm or theoretical approach to knowledge but it is not sufficient to cover all the considerations 
involved in studying knowledge.  
Because the subject of knowledge concerns and cuts across all scholarly and educational 
disciplines, a special kind of interdisciplinary effort is required to comprehend it effectively.  I see the 
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need for a more unified and integrated transdiscipline of knowledge studies.  Transdisciplinarity is a 
recent movement in higher education that seeks to move beyond the notion of disciplines altogether as 
structures that can hinder understanding of a particular problem (see, e.g., Evans, n.d.; Kreber, 2009; 
Madni, 2007; Montuori, 2012; Pop and Maties, 2008).  The limitations of the existing disciplines we have 
inherited have become increasingly apparent as scientists and scholars feel traditional disciplinary 
approaches are insufficient to tackle problems in the present world, such as global climate change.  New 
developments in science and technology, and the globalized economy, require new ways of thinking 
about education and knowledge production (Wersig, 1993).  Transdisciplinarity seeks to reconstruct 
knowledge from scratch, recombining the content knowledge of the disciplines into new formations with 
an aim to see all the angles on a problem at once, analyzing the dynamics between multiple dimensions of 
reality, unlike traditional disciplines, which can only analyze phenomena from a single level (Pop and 
Maties, n.d., Wallerstein 2004).  It is most commonly applied to technological fields such as 
nanotechnology, but I think the study of knowledge also calls out for a transdisciplinary approach. 
Transdisciplinarity would restructure the study of knowledge without framing or packaging it into 
traditional disciplines.    
While institutional recognition for knowledge studies is scant, the notion is not unprecedented.3  
The notion of a core reading list on knowledge as a transdisciplinary subject brings me to the two authors 
whom I think should retrospectively be granted the status of founding fathers in the field, Fritz Machlup 
and Michael Polanyi.  Both are canonical to the literature on knowledge management, and I feel that their 
projects, looked at together, point us in the direction of moving beyond knowledge management, which 
incorporates epistemology but has limitations of its own, toward an even more total understanding of 
knowledge needed in education.  Coming from different directions, they set up a powerful basis for 
developing a project about knowledge that keeps a focus on intellectual life, cuts across disciplines, but 
not giving primacy to any single discipline, and that can be used to analyze all kinds of knowledge: 
scholarly, business, and ideally, everything else. 
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 Both were emigrants from central Europe escaping the Nazi terror in 1933, with Machlup settling 
in the United States and Polanyi settling in England.  They came to the study of knowledge after 
establishing themselves in distinguished academic careers in very different subjects.  Their careers were 
instrumental in the rise of the conceptualization of the knowledge society.  
Machlup’s interest in knowledge developed over several decades and was only a small part of a 
distinguished career as an economist.  He wrote about knowledge production from an economic 
perspective in a 1962 book in which he began articulating a typology of the kinds and qualities of 
knowledge, and he developed the ideas further in the four-volume Information Through the Printed Word 
in 1978, but it was really his last project, Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution, and Economic 
Significance, that interests me because it is a study of the nature of knowledge that moves far beyond the 
economic questions that first stimulated the author’s interest in questions about knowledge. Economics 
was only an entry point into his investigation, and it provided him with intellectual grounding.  From 
there, he used all the tools at the scholar’s disposal to explain knowledge not only as an economic 
phenomenon but also from every other valid angle: cultural, sociological, linguistic, psychological, etc.  
He brought together the insights from all disciplines as well as from his own thought experiments.  
Although knowledge on the whole is thought of as a philosophical problem, Machlup’s approach was not 
properly philosophical, since he did not define knowledge in any analytical way.  Instead, he incorporated 
the inputs of various disciplines, approaching his topic of knowledge as one would a more ordinary topic.  
Machlup advocated an open concept of knowledge and defined it as whatever people thought was 
knowledge, and did not consider questions of truth, justification, or evidence.  His view of knowledge 
does not pass muster in disciplines that demand absolute verifiability, logical consistency, measurability, 
accuracy, and avoidance of error.  Philosophers were not satisfied with his study, and do not frequently 
cite it.  Yet his work was not properly sociological either, and the sociologists did not give it an 
enthusiastic reception.  I would say he reached beyond both philosophy and sociology. His approach to 
knowledge is most acceptable to library science.  It would be almost as accurate to say that he used no 
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disciplinary foundation as to say that he incorporated all relevant disciplines.  But he did not push into the 
final frontier of transdisciplinarity by “reimagining disciplines” (Castan Broto et al. 2009).  However, it 
seems to open a door to transdisciplinarity.  Perhaps his most lasting original contribution was his 
taxonomy of the basic types of knowledge, all of which he subjected to full scholarly analysis: Practical 
knowledge, intellectual knowledge, small talk and pastime knowledge, spiritual knowledge, and 
unwanted knowledge.  As we can see, his study seeks to give a full overview going beyond philosophy 
and sociology.  His open model of knowledge comes close to the philosophy of librarianship, and his 
approach to knowledge as a broad cultural phenomenon and defining characteristic of civilization lives on 
in works such as Peter Burke’s A Social History of Knowledge (2000-2012). 
Michael Polanyi began his career as a physical chemist, and achieved great distinction before 
changing his field of interest in his fifties to social sciences, working at first on labor and employment.  
But he soon became occupied with big picture questions about knowledge and inquiry.  He cites the major 
modern philosophers, and his work is recognizable as philosophy.4  But what is most striking about 
Polanyi’s work on knowledge is that he skips past the topics that have traditionally dominated 
philosophical epistemology and writes about the personal engagement with the world that characterizes 
discovery.  Polanyi prioritizes the interests, motives, and thought paths of the individual knower or 
inquirer. For him, knowledge is acquired through engaged inquiry, through passion and commitment.  
The inquirer could be anyone, not only a professional, skilled, or certified expert.  In contrast to 
approaches to knowledge that look at knowledge as an external phenomenon that must be apprehended by 
humans, Polanyi begins with the outlook and position of the individual inquirer or learner.  This is a 
necessary obverse to the usual approach of beginning with already existing knowledge.  In other words, 
he looks at the knowledge creation process.    
His view of the scientist is humanistic and optimistic, even idealistic.  This is in stark contrast to 
the negative, bleak, and anti-humanistic views about knowledge put forth by many sociologists of 
knowledge, especially those in the postmodernist and deconstructionist traditions (see, e.g., Mourad, 
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1995; Blum, 1971; cf. Gill, 2000).  Knowledge for him was not a view from nowhere, depersonalized and 
objective.  Rather, his approach relates to scholarly inquiry, and to the psychology of the inquiring mind.  
He looks at engaged inquiry: how people pursue knowledge through inquiry and discovery.  Such an 
approach is applicable to science, education, and everyday life. It includes multiple kinds of knowing, 
down to sensory perception.  The approach is more psychological than sociological, expanding on the 
insights of Gestalt psychology.  This approach to knowing from the inside anticipates Abraham Maslow’s 
work on positive psychology and Mihaly Csikszentmahalyi’s work on flow (Maslow, 1966; 
Czikszentmahalyi, 1990).  It is even phenomenological in that it refers to bodily awareness and practices, 
including attention, sensory perception, and involuntary movement of the muscles.  
While Machlup looked at knowledge as the achievement of civilization, Polanyi looked at the 
process of knowing from an internal point of view.  He saw knowing as an active comprehension of 
things known, requiring skill.  He aimed to understand the processes by which one integrates various 
kinds of evidence into a meaningful mental structure.  He looked at understanding, or making sense, 
grasping and integrating information to make it knowledge. Although he did not put it into those terms, he 
was interested in how information is mentally transformed into knowledge by seeing patterns in particular 
details.   
Both of these scholars, Machlup and Polanyi, focused on knowledge in ways that exceeded the 
limitations of the disciplines.  In this way, they are a model for us who want to develop an updated 
transdisciplinary study of knowledge.  No one can expect books written as long ago as Machlup’s and 
Polanyi’s to answer the questions people have now about knowledge. The world has changed in so many 
fundamental ways.  At the very least, we have already moved to a later phase of the postindustrial era 
described by the early prognosticators.  More likely, we are at the beginning a new stage of civilization in 
our relationship to knowledge.  In many respects, Machlup’s and Polanyi’s publications stand as 
historical documents of a way of thinking that flourished during the times they worked.  But I think their 
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transdisciplinary and integrative approach, as well as their scholarly and moderate outlooks, set up superb 
models for what I hope will be a new generation of knowledge studies research. 
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1 Leading recent contributors to epistemology include Dretske (1981) Lehrer (1990), Pritchard (2009).  See 
also Alcoff (1998). 
2 The role of knowledge in the liberal arts curriculum as promoting the good life has been stressed by Hirst 
(1974). 
3 See Reiner Grundmann and Nico Stehr’s five-volume anthology entitled Knowledge (2005); Steve 
Fuller’s core curriculum for an imaginary graduate program in knowledge policy studies, included as an appendix in 
his book, Social Epistemology (1988), and Wallace’s (2007) survey of knowledge management, which goes far 
beyond the usual KM literature into much of what I would call knowledge studies.  Cardiff University’s Centre for 
the Study of Knowledge Expertise Science (KES), headed by Harry Collins, 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/research/researchcentres/kes/aboutkes/index.html is focused on knowledge studies, 
and Vanier College (Montreal) has a program of courses focused around the theme of knowledge.  See  
http://www.vaniercollege.qc.ca/Auxiliary/Humanities/humknow.html 
4 Because the format of this conference presentation requires brevity, I can only mention here that Polanyi 
called attention to modes of knowledge not studied by previous philosophers of knowledge, in particular, knowledge 
which cannot be explicated about how to perform an action (e.g., riding a bicycle). The term he coined for this 
phenomenon, tacit knowledge, is the cornerstone of knowledge management, as re-interpreted by Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1996). 
